October 14th, 1944. Lorraine, France. Lieutenant General George S. Patton sits in his headquarters, Third Army Command post, where his forces are bogged down in some of the bloodiest fighting of the European campaign. Rain pours outside, turning the landscape into a muddy nightmare, while the Moselle River has become a formidable barrier to his advance.
The ancient fortress city of Mets refuses to fall despite repeated American assaults. and Patton’s rapid advance across France. The brilliant dash that made headlines in August has ground to a halt in the mud and blood of Lraine. An aid brings him routine intelligence reports containing updates on German positions, supply status, casualty figures, and weather forecasts, but nothing about Raml.
According to available records, Patton received no immediate notification about the death of Field Marshall Irwin Raml that day. Issued no statement, wrote nothing in his diary, and said nothing to his staff that anyone thought worth recording. This is the story of what Patton said when Raml died.
And what Patton didn’t say, why the silence exists, and what that silence reveals about these two legendary generals and the strange relationship between them. But before we start, hit that like button and subscribe if you want YouTube to recommend you more content like this. And share any stories you or your relatives have from World War II down in the comments.
All right, let’s go back to understand Raml’s death and why Patton’s reaction or lack of reaction matters. On October 14th, 1944, at approximately 12:30 p.m. German time, Field Marshal Airwin Raml died in a car on a quiet road near Helingan, Germany, succumbing to cyanide poisoning in what was officially suicide, but actually murder forced by the Nazi regime.
According to testimony from his son Manfred and other witnesses, two generals from Berlin, Wilhelm Burgdorf and Ernst Misel visited RML that morning at his home and informed him that he was implicated in the July 20th plot to assassinate Adolf Hitler. RML was given three choices that morning, each one terrible in its own way.
He could face trial in the people’s court, which meant certain conviction, public disgrace, and execution, with his family arrested and likely killed as well. He could refuse to cooperate and be arrested immediately with the same catastrophic results for himself and his loved ones. or he could take cyanide, die quietly, and Hitler would claim Raml died from wounds suffered in an air attack in July, allowing his family to remain safe, his reputation to remain intact, and his name to receive the honor of a state funeral. RML chose the cyanide after
carefully considering his options and the fate of his family. He told his wife and his 15-year-old son what was happening, explaining the impossible choice he faced. He put on his Africa Corb jacket, the uniform that represented his greatest triumphs. He picked up his field marshals baton, the symbol of his rank and achievement.
He got into Burgdorf’s car with the two generals who had brought him this death sentence, and 15 minutes later, he was dead. The German government announced Raml’s death on October 15th with a carefully crafted statement designed to deceive the world. According to the official statement, Field Marshall Raml had died from the severe head injuries he suffered on July 17th when Allied aircraft strafed his staff car in Normandy.
Wounds that had finally proven fatal after months of struggle. Hitler declared a day of national mourning to honor the fallen hero, and Raml would receive a full state funeral with all the ceremonies befitting his rank and reputation. The German people were told their great desert fox had died a hero’s death in service to the Reich, succumbing at last to wounds received in combat against the enemy.
The truth that Raml had been murdered by his own government for suspected involvement in the conspiracy against Hitler remained a closely guarded secret known only to a handful of Nazi officials. Some German officers suspected the truth immediately, recognizing that the timing and circumstances seemed suspicious. Some Allied intelligence officers also suspected something was wrong with the official story.
But officially and publicly, RML died from war wounds, and that was the story the world heard in October 1944. And according to available records, Patton heard the same story that everyone else did. RML had died from his injuries sustained in July, becoming another casualty of the air war, another general dead before the war ended.
This is what matters when we ask what Patton said when RML died. Patton heard the German propaganda version about wounds and heroes. Not the truth about forced suicide and Nazi murder. He heard that RML died from wounds received in combat, which was a lie, but a lie that was widely accepted at the time. He did not know RML was forced to commit suicide at gunpoint by Nazi generals.
He did not know about Hitler’s ultimatumthat threatened Raml’s family. He did not know Raml had been murdered by his own regime to prevent him from becoming a symbol of opposition. And more importantly, according to available historical records from multiple sources, Patton said nothing at all about Raml’s death.
There is no statement from Patton about Raml’s death in military archives that have been searched by historians and researchers. There is no entry in Patton’s diary for October 14th or 15th about RML, which is significant because Patton kept a detailed diary throughout the war and wrote regularly about battles, frustrations with superiors, other generals he encountered and everything that concerned him or caught his attention.
According to his diary entries from October 1944, which have been preserved and published, Patton was focused entirely on the Lraine campaign and its many frustrations. He wrote extensively about the weather and how it hampered operations. He wrote about supply problems that limited his ability to advance. He wrote about attacking Mets and his determination to take the fortress city.
He wrote about his frustration with being forced to fight a slow, grinding battle instead of the mobile warfare he preferred and excelled at. He did not write about Raml’s death, not even a single sentence acknowledging it. There are no letters from Patton mentioning Raml’s death in the extensive collections of his correspondents.
Patton corresponded regularly with his wife Beatus, sharing his thoughts and frustrations in detailed letters. He wrote to other generals about military matters and personal concerns. He wrote official reports that went up the chain of command. According to collections of Patton’s wartime correspondents which have been compiled and published by historians, there are no letters from October or November 1944 that mention Raml’s death or make any reference to it.
There are no accounts from Patton’s staff officers about Patton reacting to news of Raml’s death, which is notable because his staff officers were usually attentive to his moods and statements. After the war, many of Patton’s staff officers wrote memoirs or gave interviews to historians describing Patton’s moods, his statements, his reactions to various events throughout the war.
According to these accounts which have been extensively studied, none of them remembered Patton saying anything about Raml dying or expressing any reaction to the news. Patton’s press officer kept records of press conferences and public statements made to journalists which was standard practice for all senior commanders. According to these records, Patton did not make any public comment about Raml’s death to the press corps that followed third army.
This silence is striking when we consider Patton’s usual behavior and personality. Patton was not a quiet man by any measure, and he was famous throughout the army for speaking his mind on virtually every subject. He gave speeches to his troops that became legendary for their profanity and inspiration. He wrote constantly in his diary and in letters, recording his thoughts and opinions.
He had opinions about everything and everyone from grand strategy to individual soldiers to the weather to politics. His profanity was legendary among soldiers and officers alike with his colorful language becoming part of his public image. His pronouncements were quoted by reporters and repeated by soldiers who heard them or heard about them from others.
According to people who knew him well, including family members and close associates, Patton rarely kept his opinions to himself and usually expressed whatever he was thinking. But about Raml’s death in October 1944, Patton was completely silent, leaving no trace in the historical record. This silence is the historical record, stark and complete, with no words from Patton about RML’s death having survived in any form.
No statement to the press, no diary entry for his personal reflection, no letter to his wife or friends, no comment to staff officers, no press conference remark, nothing at all. This raises obvious questions that historians have pondered. Did Patton not care about RML’s death? Did he not notice the news when it was announced? Did he not think RML’s death was important enough to comment on? Did he say something that simply wasn’t recorded by anyone present? To understand this silence and what it means, we need to understand the
relationship between Patton and Raml, what they knew about each other, what they thought of each other, and what was happening in October 1944. That might explain why Patton remained silent. George Patton and Irwin RML never met in combat, which is a crucial fact to understand when examining their relationship.
In the popular imagination fostered particularly by the 1970 film Pattern starring George C. Scott. These two generals are portrayed as rivals who fought each other directly in North Africa. The famous line from the filmRaml you magnificent bastard. I read your book suggests a personal jewel between the two commanders as if they were chess players matching wits across the desert.
But this never actually happened in reality and the historical record is clear on this point. According to historical records and military archives, Patton and Raml were never on the same battlefield at the same time, never commanded opposing forces in the same battle and never had any direct military confrontation. RML commanded the Africa Corps in North Africa from February 1941 until March 1943, earning his reputation as the Desert Fox through brilliant victories and daring raids.
Patton first arrived in North Africa in November 1942 as commander of the Western Task Force, which invaded Morocco as part of Operation Torch. After the disaster at Casarine Pass in February 1943, where American forces suffered a humiliating defeat, Patton took command of Doy in early March 1943 to restore American fighting spirit.
According to official military records, Raml left North Africa on March 9th, 1943. Ordered back to Germany by Hitler, who wanted him to rest and recover from illness. RML never returned to Africa. His time fighting in the desert finished forever. Patton took command of Dukie Corsore on March 6th, just 3 days before Raml departed.
For three days, technically speaking, Patton and Raml were both in North Africa commanding forces that might have fought each other in battle, but they never did. And those three days passed without any direct confrontation. According to military records and battle reports, Patton’s offensive operations began on March 17th, 8 days after Raml had already departed for Germany.
When Patton attacked at Elgatar and pushed toward the coast in operations that restored American confidence, he was fighting German forces commanded by General Jurgen vonanim, not Raml. So Patton and Raml never fought each other directly in any battle, but they knew about each other through intelligence reports and reputation.
According to various accounts from both sides, both generals were aware of the others reputation and accomplishments. Raml knew about Patton from German intelligence reports and military briefings. According to captured German documents and postwar interviews with German officers who served in intelligence, RML received regular intelligence reports about American commanders and their capabilities.
RML knew Patton commanded aggressive armored forces and favored bold rapid attacks similar to his own tactical style. According to one German intelligence summary from 1944, before the Normandy invasion, German commanders considered Patton the most dangerous American general and the one most likely to cause them serious problems.
The Germans believed Patton would lead the main invasion at Calala, not the diversionary landing at Normandy, which shows how seriously they took him. This belief was actually the result of Allied deception operations designed to confuse the Germans, but it reflected genuine German respect for Patton’s reputation as a commander. RML himself, according to various sources, including his published papers and letters, made positive comments about American tactical abilities after fighting them.
In his papers which were published after the war by his family, RML wrote about fighting in North Africa and in Normandy against American forces. According to these writings, RML respected American mobility and firepower, acknowledging that American forces were more capable than German propaganda admitted. He specifically praised Patton’s operations in France in 1944, calling them the most astonishing achievements in mobile warfare, which was high praise from a general known for mobile warfare himself.
But Raml made this comment about operations in France in August 1944, long after he left North Africa, and he never fought against Patton directly, even when making these observations. Patton knew about Raml and had studied his career and tactics. According to various accounts from people who knew Patton, he studied Raml carefully and respected his abilities.
RML had published a book in 1937 called Infantry Attacks based on his experiences in World War I where he won Germany’s highest decoration. The book was translated and published in the United States and became available to American military officers. According to accounts from people who knew Patton, including his aids and fellow officers, he read military literature constantly and certainly knew Raml’s book and its contents.
Whether Patton actually studied RML’s specific tactics before going to North Africa is debated by historians and cannot be proven definitively. The famous movie line about reading RML’s book is fiction written for dramatic effect by the screenwriters. But Patton certainly knew RML’s reputation throughout the military world, which was considerable.
According to Patton’s own writings and letters that have beenpreserved, he understood Raml was a skilled commander who favored aggressive mobile tactics similar to Patton’s own preferences and fighting style. In North Africa, according to accounts from staff officers who served with Patton, he spoke about wanting to fight RML and test himself against the famous desert fox.
Patton saw Raml as the enemy general he most wanted to defeat in battle, viewing it as a challenge worth pursuing. According to one account from a staff officer, Patton told an aid that defeating Raml would prove American armor could match German armor which mattered to Patton who cared deeply about America’s military reputation. But again, this fight never happened and the anticipated duel never materialized, leaving both generals to fight other opponents.
After North Africa, Patton and RML fought in different theaters and continued to miss each other. Patton commanded seventh army in Sicily in 1943, racing across the island in competition with Montgomery, then third army in France, starting in August 1944 after being sidelined following the slapping incidents.
RL spent time in Italy in 1943 inspecting defenses and preparing for the Allied invasion expected there. Then took command of Army Group B in France defending against the Allied invasion everyone knew was coming. According to military records, Raml was in Normandy from late 1943 until July 17th, 1944 when he was severely wounded by Allied aircraft strafing his staff car.
Patton arrived in Normandy in late July 1944. Brought over to take command of Third Army after the breakout began. Third Army became operational on August 1st, launching the Great Armored Offensive across France. By then, Raml was in a hospital in France recovering from his wounds and he never returned to command. So once again, Patton and RML were in the same theater at nearly the same time, but never actually faced each other in battle or commanded opposing forces.
Patton’s breakout from Normandy in August 1944, and his rapid advance across France, which made him famous and terrified the Germans, happened after RML was wounded and permanently out of action. The German commanders fighting against Patton in August and September were other generals with less reputation and less skill. Not RML.
Patton knew this from intelligence reports that kept him informed of enemy commanders. According to intelligence reports available to Third Army and preserved in archives, Patton’s staff knew which German commanders opposed them at any given time. They knew RML was not there opposing them. They knew he’d been wounded in July and was no longer in command of anything.
This is the context for understanding Patton’s silence in October 1944 and why he said nothing. Patton and Raml were legendary generals, both famous for aggressive armored warfare, both controversial figures who clashed with their superiors, both beloved by their troops and feared by their enemies, creating public images that made them famous.
They seemed like natural rivals, matched opponents destined to fight each other. The press portrayed them as rivals in their coverage of the war. Soldiers talked about them as rivals and wondered who would win if they fought. But they never actually fought each other in any meaningful way, never commanded opposing forces in the same battle, never tested their skills against each other.
They were aware of each other through intelligence reports and reputation, respected each other’s abilities as commanders, but had no personal relationship of any kind. They never met face tof face. They never corresponded or exchanged messages. According to available records from both American and German archives, they never exchanged messages or communications of any kind, neither official nor personal.
They were famous generals on opposite sides of a war, but they were not connected by any direct experience of combat against each other or any personal interaction. This makes Patton’s silence in October 1944 easier to understand when we consider the practical realities. When RML died, Patton had no particular reason to comment publicly on his death.
They weren’t personal enemies who had fought memorable battles against each other. They weren’t even battlefield opponents in any meaningful sense that would create a bond. RML was just another German general who died, one among many dying in 1944, and Patton had no special connection to him. But there’s more to consider about why Patton remained silent beyond just the lack of personal connection.
In October 1944, Patton was not thinking about RML or any other German general who wasn’t directly opposing him. He was thinking about Mets, the fortress city that blocked his advance and frustrated all his efforts. According to military records and Patton’s diary entries from this period, October 1944 was one of the most frustrating and difficult periods of Patton’s entire war.
After the spectacular success in August, when Third Army raced across France andliberated vast territories in just weeks, covering ground faster than anyone thought possible, Patton’s advance had stalled completely by October. The reason was logistics. The unglamorous reality of supply lines and fuel trucks.
According to official histories of the campaign, Third Army outran its supply lines in September, advancing so fast that supplies couldn’t keep up. Gasoline was scarce with tanks sitting idle for lack of fuel. Ammunition was limited, rationed carefully because there wasn’t enough. Food and other supplies were rationed as well with Third Army given lower priority than other units.
On September 25th, according to official orders from higher headquarters, Patton was ordered to go on the defensive and stop advancing. Other Allied armies to the north, particularly Montgomery’s forces, were given priority for supplies because Eisenhower favored the northern advance. Patton was told to hold his positions and prepare for a general offensive in November, when supplies would be more plentiful.
But Patton hated defense with a passion that everyone who knew him recognized. According to his diary entries from this period, he believed stopping the advance gave the Germans time to reorganize and strengthen their defenses, wasting the opportunity created by August’s success. He believed aggressive action was always better than passive waiting regardless of circumstances or supply situation.
So Patton looked for ways to keep attacking despite limited supplies. Determined to maintain offensive momentum, in October, Patton focused his attention and his army’s efforts on Mets, the fortress city that stood in his path. According to military records and planning documents, Mets was an ancient fortress city on the Moselle River, heavily fortified with massive forts built in the late 1800s by the Germans when they controlled the region.
The city blocked Patton’s advance toward Germany, sitting directly in the path he wanted to take. Patton decided to attack it rather than bypass it, overruling advice from some of his staff. According to accounts from his staff officers, some officers argued Mets should be bypassed rather than attacked directly, left isolated while third army advanced around it.
The forts were too strong, they argued, too well-built to take by assault. The city could be isolated and left to wither without supplies, forcing its eventual surrender without costly attacks. But Patton wanted Mets taken by force, believing passionately that it had to be captured. According to his statements to his staff, he believed leaving a strong German garrison in his rear was dangerous strategically, creating problems for his supply lines.
He believed aggressive action was always correct regardless of cost or difficulty because it maintained initiative and morale. He believed his troops needed to keep fighting to maintain their edge and their aggressive spirit. So on October 3rd, according to military records and operation orders, Third Army began attacking toward Mets with multiple divisions.
The assault on Fort Driant, one of the main forts protecting the city, began on October 3rd with American infantry and engineers. According to official casualty reports and after action reports, the attack was a complete disaster from the beginning. The Americans were not trained for fighting in fixed fortifications of this type.
Having focused on mobile warfare, they lacked proper equipment for fortress warfare, including specialized explosives and flamethrowers. They lacked intelligence about the fort’s layout, going in essentially blind. They suffered heavy casualties, losing men to German fire from positions they didn’t know existed. On October 13th, according to military records, Patton ordered the attack on Fort Gryant suspended after 10 days of bloody failure.
It was the only battle Patton ever lost during the entire war, a fact that bothered him deeply. The fort would not be taken until December, long after Third Army had bypassed it and advanced beyond in the general November offensive. This was the situation on October 14th, 1944 when RML died in Germany, explaining Patton’s state of mind.
Patton was dealing with the failure at Fort Driant, which hurt his pride and his reputation. He was frustrated by the slow progress at Mets, which seemed to mock his theories about aggressive warfare. He was angry about supply shortages that prevented him from advancing as he wanted. According to his diary entries from mid-occtober, which are filled with frustration and anger, Patton was writing constantly about his problems with higher command, his problems with logistics, his problems with the weather that seemed to conspire against him. It rained constantly in
October throughout the Lraine region, turning the battlefield into a swamp. The Moselle River flooded its banks, making crossing more difficult. Roads turned to mud that bogged down vehicles and made movement exhausting. Tanks bogged down in the mud, unable tomaneuver effectively. Casualties mounted steadily day after day, filling hospital units.
According to official records and casualty reports, Third Army suffered over 1,200 killed in October, over 6,000 wounded and nearly 1,000 missing, making it one of the bloodiest months of the campaign. This was not the glorious mobile warfare pattern loved and excelled at. Not the racing across France that made headlines. This was grinding, bloody, frustrating combat that accomplished little despite the cost.
the kind of warfare Patton despised and Patton was consumed by it, thinking about nothing else. According to everyone who knew him and worked with him, Patton focused intensely on whatever battle was in front of him, giving it his complete attention. In October 1944, that battle was Mets. That focus was Lraine. That concern was the slow, costly advance toward Germany through mud and rain.
RL’s death, announced in German newspapers and German radio broadcasts that Allied intelligence monitored, was just another piece of war news, important perhaps in some abstract sense to the overall picture of the war, but not relevant to Patton’s immediate concerns or his current battles. There’s another factor to consider when understanding Patton’s silence about RML’s death.
The truth about Raml’s forced suicide did not become widely known until after the war ended, which is important for understanding what Patton knew. According to various accounts from German officers and officials, some German officers suspected immediately that Raml’s death was not from war wounds as claimed.
The timing was suspicious, coming just as the purges following the July 20th plot were reaching their peak. Raml had been recovering from his July injuries according to medical reports. Then suddenly he died in mid-occtober right when hundreds of other officers connected to the plot were being arrested and killed.
But the German government controlled information absolutely preventing any alternative narratives from emerging. The official story was that Raml died from his wounds received in combat dying a hero’s death. Hitler gave him a state funeral to reinforce this narrative and show respect. According to news reports from Germany, the funeral was held on October 18th, 1944, 4 days after Raml died with full military honors.
Hitler sent a wreath and a personal message of condolence. Field Marshall von Runet gave a eulogy praising Raml’s service and sacrifice. The ceremony was designed to show respect for a fallen hero and convince everyone that RML died honorably. It was all propaganda designed to conceal murder, but it was effective propaganda.
RML had been murdered by the Nazi regime to prevent him from becoming a symbol of opposition, but the world was told he died a hero’s death serving the fatherland. When Raml died, Patton had no reason to say anything about it. And so he didn’t say anything at all. And so he didn’t, leaving us with silence. This is the answer to what Patton said when Raml died that the historical record gives us. He said nothing.
The historical record is silent and complete in its silence. In the years after World War II, Patton did occasionally mention Raml in a few contexts when discussing the war. According to accounts from the late 1940s, after Patton’s own death in December 1945, some of his speeches and private comments were published by various sources.
In these published materials, Patton sometimes mentioned Raml as an example of skillful tactics or aggressive leadership worth studying, but these were passing references in broader discussions, not detailed assessments of Raml’s career or abilities. Patton died just over a year after RML in December 1945 from injuries sustained in a car accident in Germany.
Ironically dying the same way RML was supposed to have died. He was never asked directly about Raml’s death by anyone. He never wrote about it publicly in any forum. The silence remained permanent and unbroken. The truth about Raml’s death emerged gradually after the war as witnesses came forward. According to various accounts from the late 1940s and 1950s, RML’s son, Manfred, eventually told the story of what happened on October 14th, 1944, revealing the forced suicide.
Other witnesses came forward with their accounts confirming the story. Documents were discovered in captured German archives, providing additional evidence. By the late 1940s and 1950s, the world knew Raml had been forced to commit suicide by Hitler’s regime. He had not died from his July wounds as claimed. He had been murdered by Hitler to prevent any possibility of his opposing the regime.
All right, let us know in the comments below what do you think about this. Hit that like button and subscribe if you want YouTube to recommend you more content like this. And share any stories you or your relatives have from World War II down in the comments. All right, and thanks for watching.
